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TRANSLATION 
 
Cuvier’s Situation in the History of Biology 
Michel Foucault1 
 
Introduction by Lynne Huffer 
In May 1969, the Institut d’Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques at the University of Paris held 
a colloquium to mark the bicentennial of the birth of Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), anatomist, zool-
ogist, and founder of the discipline of vertebrate paleontology. Foucault opened the colloquium 
with a brief presentation, followed by a lively discussion with colloquium participants Bernard 
Balan, Georges Canguilhem, Yvette Conry, Francis Courtès, François Dagognet, and Camille Li-
moges. The springboard for the discussion was a thesis Foucault had put forward in his 1966 
book, The Order of Things: that contrary to standard conceptions of Cuvier’s fixism as counter to 
evolutionary thinking, Cuvier made Darwin possible.  
 In his opening presentation, Foucault elaborates on his earlier claim in The Order of Things: 
that Cuvier’s function-based system made possible anatomical disarticulation and thereby created 
the conditions of possibility for modern biology. Darwin’s work, Foucault insists, could not have 
occurred without the transformation of knowledge brought about by Cuvier. Foucault renders 
Cuvier as a transitional figure rather than as a static classifier stuck in the classical age; he be-
comes, as Foucault puts it, the “passage” between the “unity of type” of the classical age and the 
“conditions of existence” of evolutionary biology. 
 In focusing on Cuvier as a thinker who made possible the biology that followed, we might 
recall Foucault’s “What Is an Author?,” where Foucault describes Cuvier as an “initiator of dis-
cursivity.”2 As an initiating practice, Cuvier’s discourse “created a possibility for something other 
                                                 
1
 Originally published as “La situation de Cuvier dans l’histoire de la biologie,” Revue d’histoire des sciences et de 
leurs applications 23, #1 (janvier-mars 1970, pp. 63-92.) (Journées Cuvier, Institute for the History of Science, Paris, 
May 30-31, 1969). Republished in Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975 (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001), 898-
934. 
2
 Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?,” translated Josué Harari, in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol-
ume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 217, translation 
modified. 
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than [his] discourse.”3 From this perspective, Cuvier made possible “a theory of evolution dia-
metrically opposed to his own fixism.”4 Unlike the normative founding of a science, the discourse 
called “Cuvier” initiates a discursive practice but “does not participate in its later transfor-
mations.”5 Rather than determining the laws and structures that have come to define evolution-
ary biology, Cuvier’s discourse engages the history of biology recursively: as a discursive prac-
tice, “Cuvier” necessitates a “return to [an] origin” whose forgetting is itself constitutive of the 
field and “part of the discursivity in question.”6 This means, Foucault insists in “What Is an Au-
thor,?” that we must return to the “text itself,” both for “its nudity” and for the textual “lacuna” 
such a return exposes.7  
 Today we might read the translated colloquium in that recursive mode: as a return to the 
origin of a discursive field, and as an approach to a text whose lacunary nudity Foucault had an-
ticipated, three months earlier, in a more famous 1969 colloquium, “What Is an Author?” Toward 
the end of the Cuvier colloquium, Foucault refers indirectly to “What Is an Author?,” lamenting 
his own use of the proper name, Cuvier. “Only with difficulty can the analysis of these transfor-
mations be referred to a precise individual,” he says. He admits to feeling uneasy about the prop-
er names he used in The Order of Things: Cuvier, Bopp, Ricardo. “My concern,” he says, “is to 
track transformation. In other words, the author does not exist.”  
 Originally published in 1970 in Revue d’histoire des sciences et de leurs applications, the 1969 
Cuvier colloquium appears here in English in its entirety for the first time.8 “Cuvier’s Situation in 
the History of Biology” not only offers new insights into Foucault’s thinking, but also gives a 
glimpse of a range of scientific reactions to his work. The colloquium as a whole represents a val-
uable resource not only for Foucault specialists, but also for those interested in the contemporary 
return to biology in theory and philosophy, the rise of new materialisms and animal studies, and 
the Anthropocene discourses that draw, implicitly, on Cuvier’s paleontological perspective on 
extinction.9 The Cuvier colloquium covers a range of topics: anatomical function and situation; 
the epistemological and ontological thresholds that divide class, order, genus, and species; the 
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 Ibid., 218. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?” Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975 (Paris: Quarto Gallimard), 836, translation 
mine. This section of Foucault’s original lecture, presented in French at the Société Française de philosophie in 
February 1969, was omitted from the published English translation. 
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 Ibid., 836. 
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 For an earlier English translation of Foucault’s presentation without the discussion that follows see “Cuvier’s 
Position in the History of Biology,” trans. Felicity Edholm, Critique of Anthropology 4 (1979): 125-130. 
9
 As Martin Rudwick explains, Cuvier’s “fossil bones seemed ‘to prove the existence of a world anterior to ours, 
destroyed by some kind of catastrophe.’” See Martin J. S. Rudwick, The Meaning of Fossils: Episodes in the History 
of Palaeontology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, 109). Also see Martin J. S. Rudwick, Georges Cuvier, 
Fossil Bones, and Geological Catastrophes: New Translations and Interpretations of the Primary Texts (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1997). 
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limits of extension; the importance of milieu; perspectives on the classical scale of beings; Buffon, 
Linnaeus, and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire; spider monkeys and cephalopods; the relations that bring 
together human hands, cats’ claws, and bats’ wings; the connections between dogs’ paws and 
seals’ flippers.  
 Through all of this detail, Foucault makes the case for a “Cuvier transformation” that pre-
pares the way for the modern life sciences. Accompanying the eruption of life in the 19th century 
are three specifically modern philosophical preoccupations: death, sexuality, and history. Fou-
cault ends the colloquium by insisting on the humanism subtending this eruption: “humanist phi-
losophy: every philosophy that views death as the last and ultimate meaning of life;” “humanist 
philosophy: every philosophy that thinks sexuality is for loving and proliferating;” “humanist 
philosophy: every philosophy that believes history is tied to the continuity of consciousness.” 
Foucault’s reminder that these humanist themes, which provide the “philosophical sanction” of a 
transformation that began with Cuvier, might give us all—humanists, posthumanists, and anti-
humanists alike—some much needed food for thought.  
 
Presentation by Michel Foucault: 
I would like to specify what I mean by the term epistemological transformation, and illustrate this 
with two examples.  
 The first concerns biology: the position of the individual and of individual variation in 
biological knowledge. 
 It could be said that if there were anyone who believed in species—anyone who, uncon-
cerned with what existed below the level of species and who, running up against the limit of spe-
cies, could never get below the level of species to apply biological knowledge to the individual—
it would be Cuvier. Cuvier held that everything was arranged from, for, and toward species. On 
the other hand, we all know what Darwin says about species. For Darwin, species is never, sub-
stantively or analytically, the primary and ultimate reality that it is for Cuvier. For Darwin, it is 
difficult to distinguish species from variety. And he offers numerous examples about which we 
could not say, as good botanists or zoologists: “this is a species,” or “this is a variety.” Further, 
Darwin acknowledged the progressive reinforcement of individual variation. According to him, 
even within a species we find small variations; those variations become increasingly more pro-
nounced, eventually breaking through the frame which, a posteriori, was prescribed for that spe-
cies; and finally, from variation to variation, individuals are linked with one another on top of 
and beyond the definition given for their species. In general, Darwin acknowledges that all the 
taxonomic frames proposed for classifying animals and plants are, to a certain point, abstract cat-
egories. For Darwin, then, there is one reality that is the individual and a second reality that de-
fines the “varietivity” [“variativité”] of the individual: its capacity to vary. Everything else (be it 
species, genus, order) is a kind of construction built from this reality’s starting point: the individ-
ual. In that sense, we can say that Darwin is absolutely opposed to Cuvier. And curiously, he 
seems to return to a tendency we find in the classical taxonomy of the 17th and 18th centuries: the 
methodists, for example, and Lamarck in particular, asked about the reality of species and as-
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sumed a continuity of nature so tightly woven, without interruption, that even species would be 
seen as an abstract category. There is a return, in Darwin, to the themes found not only in La-
marck, but also in the methodists of the Lamarckian period. One might ask if, in the history of the 
biology of the individual, there was not a leap from Jussieu or Lamarck to Darwin that bypassed 
Cuvier. Such a leap would mean enucleating Cuvier from this history altogether. I think such an 
analysis would be neither adequate nor completely justified. As is often the case with these phe-
nomena of return, repetition, and reactivation, beneath them lies another complex phenomenon – 
a highly charged process of transformation. 
 I would like to show how the individual, or more precisely the critique of species in La-
marck and his contemporaries, is neither superimposable nor isomorphic with the critique of spe-
cies we find in Darwin. I want to show that the Darwinian critique of species could not have oc-
curred without the transformation, reorganization, and redistribution of biological knowledge 
brought about by the work of Cuvier. What was that transformation? 
 Classical taxonomy was essentially the science of species: the definition of differences that 
separate one species from another; the classification of those differences; the establishment of 
general categories for those differences; the organization of those differences into hierarchies that 
relate them to one another. In other words, the entire edifice of classical taxonomy begins with 
specific difference and tries to define high-level differences on a scale calibrated to specific differ-
ence. 
 I think we have evidence for the fact that biological classification chooses specific differ-
ence as its minimal element, or that it cannot break through to the level below it; for example, 
Linnaeus says that knowledge [connaissance] of individuals and variety is a florist’s knowledge 
and not a botanist’s difference. He also says that knowledge of variety is important for the econ-
omy, medicine, and cooking, but goes no further than this. He adds: knowledge of variety is a 
practical knowledge. By contrast, theory and science begin beyond the level of species. The exist-
ence of this threshold between the individual and species brings with it a series of consequences. 
 First, between specific difference and individual difference there is a gap, a leap, a thresh-
old. This threshold is the one out of which scientific knowledge can begin. Individual difference is 
not relevant for science. One can say that between individuals and species there is an epistemo-
logical threshold. 
 
      Species 
        
No scientific knowledge [connaissance] Possible scientific knowledge [connaissance] 
     Genus Order Class  Constructions of knowledge[savoir] 
   Individuals 
 
    Epistemological 
    Threshold 
 
On the other hand, if it is true that what is given as the primary object of science is species and 
specific differences, then everything that will be built, starting with specific difference—the dif-
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ference of differences, or the resemblance of differences, differences more general than specific 
differences, and thus categories more general than species—will be constructions. Those construc-
tions of knowledge [savoir] which, unlike the definition of species, will not be grounded in a given 
offered to experience; hypotheses that will be more or less verified; hypotheses that will be more 
or less grounded [bien fondées]; hypotheses that will perhaps coincide with facts. And everything 
above the level of species will not belong to the same ontological category as that which belongs 
to species or that which belongs to the individual, below the level of species. Between species and 
genus we will have a new threshold that will no longer be epistemological but, this time, ontolog-
ical. 
 
   Species 
        
  
      Order Class   
  
 
 
  Epistemological  Ontological 
  threshold  threshold 
 
This means that it is above the level of the individual that knowledge [savoir] will be organized. 
Starting with species, we enter into the order of knowledge, a knowledge not given but construct-
ed. And below the level of species, we have a set of realities that are effectively given in experi-
ence. 
From there we encounter the problem of classical taxonomy: how to build genera that are 
real, or at least—since genera are never real—well grounded [bien fondé] genera? Here is the an-
tinomy and opposition between the systematicians and the methodists. The systematicians say 
that, in any event, beyond the level of species reality cannot be directly accessed. One must 
choose a classificatory technique which, although arbitrary, will be efficient and convenient. By 
contrast, the methodists say that, to some extent, classes and classificatory constructions have to 
be adjusted to the general resemblances given in experience. A salad and a fir tree cannot be slot-
ted into the same category. But whether based in a natural method or an arbitrary system, it will 
always be beyond the ontological threshold. 
The problem is to know how this configuration of classical taxonomy will be transformed. 
How one will be able to find, in individuals who from then on will be known across species and 
genus, the same single thread of reality (for Darwin, this thread will be genealogy.) How Darwin 
will, on the one hand, eradicate the epistemological threshold and show that, in fact, we have to 
begin by knowing the individual with its individual variations; on the other, he will show how, 
beginning with the individual, what will be established as its species, its order, or its class will be 
the reality of its genealogy: a succession of individuals. We have, then, a uniform table, without a 
system, with a double threshold. This transformation was achieved through the work of Cuvier. 
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Comparative anatomy, as Cuvier practiced it, made its first impact by introducing itself as 
an instrument for the taxonomic classification and organization of species. It also had the effect of 
according the same ontological weight to species, genus, order, and class. The first effect of com-
parative anatomy was therefore to eradicate this ontological threshold. What comparative anato-
my showed was that all the categories super-ordinate to species, above the level of species, are 
not simply, as in classical taxonomy, kinds of fields of resemblance or analogical groupings to be 
established, either arbitrarily through a system of signs or through a general patterning of plants 
and animals, but are instead types of organization. From then on, to belong to a genus, an order, 
or a class is not to share with other species those characters that are less common than specific 
characters; it is not to have a generic character or a character of class; it will be to have a precise 
organization: to have a double lung and heart or a digestive apparatus situated above or below 
the nervous system. In short, to belong to a genus, a class, or an order—to belong to all that is 
above the level of species—will be to possess within oneself—in one’s anatomy, functionality, 
physiology, and mode of existence—a certain, completely analyzable structure: a structure which, 
as a result, has its own positivity. 
We therefore have positive systems of correlation. To that extent, we cannot say that genus 
exists less than species, or that class exists less than species. From species to the most general cat-
egory, there will be a single identical reality, biological reality, the reality of anatomo-
physiological function. 
The species-genus ontological threshold is thereby eradicated. From then on, ontological 
homogeneity will proceed—from the individual to the level of species, and to genus, order, and 
class—within an uninterrupted continuity. By contrast, the embedding of categories in classical 
taxonomy had been guided by the embedded structure proper to a classificatory table. But in Cu-
vier we see an anatomo-physiological embedding of all these categories with their internal sup-
port. We have this in the individual itself: it is the individual, in its actual functioning, that will 
carry within itself, in the thickness of its mechanism, all the superimpositions, all the determina-
tions, commands, regulations, and correlations that could exist among the different instances of 
the table. For Cuvier, the individual will be constituted through the embedding of anatomical 
functional structures that will constitute its branching, its class, its order, and its genus. Taken 
together, these structures that are actually present in the individual, that patiently organize them-
selves and physiologically order themselves within it, will therefore partly define its conditions of 
existence. By conditions of existence Cuvier means the confrontation of two totalities: on the one 
hand, the totality of correlations that are physiologically compatible with one another and, on the 
other, the milieu in which it lives: the nature of molecules that it has to assimilate into itself either 
through respiration or through feeding. Thus one finds, at the beginning of Revolutions of the 
Globe,10 a passage where Cuvier shows how the conditions of existence function. The individual in 
                                                 
10 Georges Cuvier, A Discourse on the Revolutions of the Surface of the Globe, and of the Changes Thereby Produced in 
the Animal Kingdom, Paris, 1825. 
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its real existence, in its life, is nothing other than the totality of both taxonomic and anatomo-
physiological structures, and this totality is also present in some way in the individual, within a 
given milieu. As a result, we have two series: one where the individual falls below the level of 
knowledge [savoir], where species, genus, and order have been ontologically linked to one anoth-
er; and another, with the real life of the individual, and the milieu within its specific generic char-
acters are found, functioning. Two types of knowledge [connaissance] can therefore be established: 
a comparative anatomy which allows for the selection, at the level of individual, of the most gen-
eral characters and the most global structures, in order to track the class, order, genus, and species 
to which it belongs; paleontology will begin with the individual as it can eventually be observed 
at the sub-individual scale when dealing with an organ, then, considering this organ, it will be 
able to recover the species by paying attention to the milieu in which it lives or by relying simul-
taneously on anatomical considerations and considerations of milieu. Thus we have two episte-
mological lines: one for comparative anatomy and one for paleontology, which are two systems of 
knowledge [savoir] that are different from the system of classical taxonomy. The ontological and 
epistemological thresholds are thus eliminated. We also see how this made Darwin possible. To 
make Darwin possible does not mean that after Cuvier there were no more transformations or 
that Darwin did not add a certain number of other transformations. In particular, what is unique 
to Cuvier, and the limit of the Cuvier transformation, is that in order to accommodate the two 
lines to each other, Cuvier was obliged to admit to a finality, which means that, with creation, 
class, order, genus, and species were calculated in a manner that would allow the individual to 
live; we have a kind of predetermination of the real conditions of the life of the individual 
through this system of finality. On the other hand, according to Cuvier the individual carries 
within itself the characters of species, of genus that are, for it, inescapable determinations. From 
there, fixism. Fixism and finality are the supplementary theoretical conditions that Cuvier was 
obliged to include in order to make his system work—this system that conditioned the whole of 
his knowledge [savoir]. This analysis of comparative anatomy with the thread of finality that 
guides it defines what Cuvier calls the unity of type. By contrast, the movement by which Cuvier 
conducts his analysis, starting with a given individual, species, or genus, within the conditions of 
the milieu in which it functions, is the analysis of conditions of existence. One can say that Cuvier 
was only able to make his system hold together by submitting the conditions of existence to the 
unity of type. This is what Darwin did, as he says in fact in The Origin of Species:11 it is to free the 
conditions of existence in relation to the unity of type. The unity of type is fundamentally no more 
than the result of work on the level of the individual. Darwin had to modify the very meaning of 
conditions of existence while, for Cuvier, conditions of existence depended on the confrontation 
between, on the one hand, the anatomo-physiological baggage that characterizes the individual 
                                                 
11 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life, 1859. 
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and encloses within it the taxonomy to which it belongs and, on the other, the milieu in which it 
lives. 
Starting with Darwin, conditions freed from the unity of type will become the conditions 
of existence given to a living individual by its milieu. 
We can thus describe the transformation out of the species-individual problem of the clas-
sical age into the species-individual problem in Darwin. It seems to me that the passage from the 
one to the other could not have happened without an entire consolidation of the epistemological 
field of biology we see operating in Cuvier’s work. And whatever the errors committed by Cuvi-
er, we can say there was a “Cuvier transformation.” 
 
Discussion: 
J. Piveteau: The paleontologists and anatomists who have closely followed Cuvier’s work—who 
consult it in the laboratory, who use it—obviously have never reached such an extended episte-
mological analysis. But I can tell you they would be very satisfied by it. It’s very illuminating to 
see such a presentation. 
F. Dagognet: Over the course of your remarks, a somewhat negative attitude about “taxon-
omy” comes through, I think. Aren’t you turning it into an abstract knowledge cut off from na-
ture? 
And yet, nothing seems more extraordinary to me. For example, Jussieu, better than any-
one, rediscovers reality. With his system and his reference points, he only needs a few indications 
in order to know everything, to derive or deduce everything. 
M. Foucault: I began by saying that there was a return in Darwin back toward Lamarck and 
Jussieu. I should perhaps offer a correction. It is indeed true that, since the middle of the 18th cen-
tury, there was always an attempt to: 
1. lower the epistemological threshold a bit below the level of specific difference; 
2. raise the ontological threshold a bit above the level of species. This was the case for the 
methodists; they criticized the Linnaean system for being arbitrary and for grouping together be-
ings that perhaps had the same characters, on condition that certain elements (sexual organs, for 
example) were not taken as differentiating characters. But if one takes more general, more visible, 
and more immediate criteria (general plant or animal morphology), and if one establishes groups, 
genera, orders, and classes—groups that acknowledge the totality of resemblances—one will end 
up with a grounded [fondé] classification. When I say “grounded,” I do not mean to say that the 
classification is cut off as an actual discontinuity. In other words, I do not think that Jussieu or 
Lamarck imagine that genera exist in a clean, neat way, or are inscribed in the individual organ-
ism itself. 
F. Dagognet: Unfortunately yes. For Jussieu, there is a character…. 
M. Foucault: But it is necessary to make a distinction between grounded [fondé] and real 
[réel]: a taxonomic category is grounded [fondée]: 
1. if, in fact, in the continuum of differences, the category groups individuals that are close 
to one another within the continuum; and 
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2. if one can, between the last element that belongs to this category and the first of the ele-
ments of the subsequent category, find a determination that is visible, certain, easy to establish, 
and recognizable to everyone. Those are two criteria for a grounded category. 
To the grounded [fondée] category, the methodists oppose the non-grounded [non-fondée] 
category of the Linnaean type. We can criticize Linnaeus for establishing categories deduced from 
different groups of individuals, for grouping together beings that belong to completely separate 
fields of resemblance and, under the pretext that their sexual organs conform to each other in the 
same way, for establishing a category that lept, in a way, beyond immediately given resem-
blances; in that sense they constituted abstract categories, or non-grounded [non fondées] catego-
ries. What Jussieu, Lamarck, and the methodists all want to create is a grounded [fondé] genus. 
J.-F. Leroy: I don’t understand. You said that species is the given for classical taxonomy. 
Genus is the constructed. I claim that the first entity that became apparent to the naturalist was 
genus, especially among botanists. At the end of the 17th century, Tournefort defined genus. Gen-
era appeared to him, not species. Species was not recognized until Tournefort. When we observe 
nature, it is genera and even families that appear. We are far from species. To such an extent that 
the notion of family was discovered very early. There were families of plants, umbellifers, compo-
sites. These were all more striking than species. They were totalities. Also, you speak about Cuvi-
er’s introduction of positivity with regard to genus. You don’t think that at the end of the 17th cen-
tury there was already positivity. Obviously you will tell me that this was natural history. I don’t 
see why you make it stop with Cuvier. As for biology, whose existence for you begins with Cuvi-
er, I see it being constituted long before the 18th century and even in the 17th century. It defined 
itself progressively. Naturalists were engaged with natural history. They were not conscious of 
engaging with biology but, little by little, they came closer to biology which, at a certain moment, 
couldn’t help but become conscious of itself and constitute itself as an autonomous discipline. 
M. Foucault: I subscribe to what you’ve just said. Even before Linnaeus, great families like 
umbellifers were established. When did I say the opposite of this? I tried to define the way in 
which, from Tournefort to Lamarck, taxonomic tables were established. That doesn’t mean that in 
the history of botany all species were successively recognized, and subsequently ordered and 
grouped. I’m looking for what was created as the law of construction for constituting something 
like taxonomy. As for natural history and biology, I don’t know what you mean by biology. For 
my part, in perhaps an arbitrary way, what I meant by natural history was the totality of methods 
through which living beings were defined as objects for possible classification, and what relations 
of order were established among them. From the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 
19th century, in order to define an object to be classified, in order to establish methods of classifica-
tion, in order to create descriptions that allowed for classification, a certain number of rules were 
put into place that characterize what I’ve called natural history, taking up the word frequently 
used at the time. It is understood that during this period many experiments were conducted with 
the aid of a microscope, and numerous studies were done on human and animal physiology. But 
having systematically bracketed that, I’ve said fairly clearly: my problem was to know how, in-
deed, for a certain number of years, living beings were classified. Consequently, I subscribe to 
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what you say when you affirm that biology began before Cuvier. It’s somewhat the same problem 
with grammar. When I studied grammar, philologists told me that historical studies had already 
been done on Latin. That was not my concern. It was to study what was once general grammar: 
how language [la langue] in general was given as an object of possible analysis. 
J.-F. Leroy: When I say that natural history continues, I mean that a certain way of classify-
ing, more or less, continues. 
M. Foucault: Yes, classifying continues and indeed one begins again to classify by using a 
certain number of methods not without analogy to those utilized in the 17th century. The way Cu-
vier classified species was different. This was where I thought I recognized a characteristic trans-
formation. I’ve never held that the classification of living beings ceased with Cuvier. I called natu-
ral history, perhaps conventionally, a mode of classification but also a certain mode of definition 
of objects, concepts, and methods. 
J. Piveteau: Contemporary classification is completely different. We try to find an order of 
genesis, whereas in the time of Cuvier it is a logical order. It is easy to transpose Cuvierian classi-
fication into this order of genesis. That was what Daudin showed before and what we do every 
day. 
F. Dagognet: The grounded order [l’ordre fondé] is not the preexisting order. A plant has 
been definitively classified, it has a unique character that makes it belong to a totality and… 
M. Foucault: That’s the grounded order [ordre fondé]. 
F. Dagognet: Why would it not be real? 
M. Foucault: To the extent that a natural continuum was accepted at that moment…. 
F. Dagognet: It was not accepted. 
M. Foucault: …. the cut between genera can only be a cut that comes from our knowledge 
[connaissance] and not a cut that comes from nature itself. It is neither absolute nor invariable, 
Adanson says. 
F. Dagognet: Jussieu says in fact that this cut is in nature and he found its key. 
M. Foucault: The fact that he found the key that allows him, in this natural continuum, to 
draw on a set of homogenous criteria which, from one end to the other, allow him to create fixed 
groups, shows that his method is grounded [fondé]. But he compares natural continuity either to a 
chain or to a geographical map. 
F. Dagognet: Genus and individual are clearly separated. The individual is the living [le vi-
vant] when it has developed. But the seed is the summary of individual and genus. We can read 
genus as we read the individual. 
M. Foucault: “Grounded” [fondé] means that genus is not arbitrary, as opposed to arbitrary 
genus in Linnaeus. Grounded genus [genre fondé] will be natural. And the word natural returns 
repeatedly when we are dealing with method. I don’t think you have the right to use the word 
‘real’ when naturalists used the word grounded [fondé] or natural. Adanson speaks in fact about 
“real” divisions, but only to say they are not real except in relation to us and not in relation to 
nature. The real cuts will be those cuts attributable to catastrophes in Buffon; for Lamarck they are 
attributable to conditions of existence. 
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The great discussion which, around 1830, pitted Cuvier against Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire, in-
fluenced, in part, how to go about identifying an element, an organ, a biological segment across 
an ensemble of species or genera: to what extent and in the name of what can one identify a man’s 
hand, a cat’s claw, a bat’s wing?  
In classical taxonomy, there was no debate about an identity among elements. It was im-
mediately given, because it was precisely that which was relied upon for the classification of be-
ings. Where an organ presented, from one individual to another, from one variety to another, 
identical elements—and very visibly identical, by size, volume, and configuration— then one was 
dealing with a character: the problem was to know if it was limited to species, if it counted for the 
entire genus, or even beyond. The point was to establish the limits of extension of an immediately 
recognizable identity. Even more, Linnaean taxonomy established the variables that alone were 
supposed to be relevant for defining a difference and consequently a limit within identity: only 
variations of form, height, disposition, and number were retained (color, by contrast, did not af-
fect the identity of an element and did not become part of the scientific character). In sum, we can 
say that in this natural history identity was immediately visible and that its limits were systemati-
cally constructed. 
For Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, identity can be hidden. It is not immediately apparent that the 
pieces of membrane one finds over the gills of fish can be put in correspondence with the ossicles 
of the inner ear in higher vertebrates. As for the limits established by the systematists, we need to 
challenge them one by one. A difference in number should not impede the tracking of an identical 
element (the hyoid bone is composed of five little bones in man, nine in cats); a difference in size 
is not necessarily relevant: one needs to recognize a thumb in the rudimentary fingers found in 
certain spider monkeys; form, also, can vary against a background of identity (one has to learn to 
move from a dog’s paw to a seal’s flipper); finally, disposition can change without the disappear-
ance of identity (the cephalopod can be considered as a vertebrate bent forward to bring the pel-
vis and the legs closer to the head). Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire therefore does not retain any of the 
criteria of identification usually accepted in the 18th century. 
Further, he directly challenges the functional criterion of identity: the same function can be 
assumed by different elements (will one say that a crutch is a leg?); the same ensemble of ele-
ments can have very different functions in a child or in an adult (a child’s feet are of no use for 
walking, and yet they are feet). 
At the same time, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire acknowledges the identity of a biological element 
across so much diversity, if the situation or the transformation in the species that would make it 
recognizable can be established. Therefore, he says, I give the name foot to the set of anatomical 
elements that will follow from the third segment of the lowest limb of an animal. 
The foot is a certain anatomical situation, or again, I can recognize a human hyoid bone in that of 
the cat because I can define the elements that grew together, those that have disappeared, those 
that persist as ligaments, those that have changed their profile. Identity is not a visible given: it is 
the result of the establishment of a relation (of an “analogy,” says Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire) and the 
tracking of a transformation. 
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How did this passage occur between the “taxonomic” identity of natural history and this 
analogical identity? Once again we must refer back to Cuvier. Cuvier, like Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, 
accepts a general principle of analogy: “The bodies of all animals are formed by the same ele-
ments and are composed of analogous organs.” Further, for Cuvier as for Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, 
the correspondence between two organs is not established by an identity of form (from worms to 
higher vertebrates, they grow in complexity), nor by proportion (depending on the animal the 
level of respiration and movement can vary), nor by position (in the animal kingdom, there is a 
spatial inversion of the nervous and digestive systems.) Neither Cuvier nor Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
accept any of the criteria of identification used by the classical thinkers. The disappearance of 
these criteria is a transformation common to Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. 
So it seems to me that this transformation was implied by comparative anatomy as we find 
it in Cuvier; and that it, in turn, made possible two different systematizations—that of Cuvier and 
that of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. 
1. Comparative anatomy made possible a confrontation of species that did not happen 
gradually, but moved from one extreme to the other. It made it possible to retain everything liv-
ing beings held in common, whatever their complexity or their level of organization. It made it 
possible to seize each set of elements in their maximal transformation. And, as a result, the criteria 
for identification (form, size, disposition, number) that counted for establishing close differences 
had to be excluded. The space of differentiation changed in scale. 
2. Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire therefore had to resolve the same problem: to track an 
organic identity by following a constant that was not immediately given to perception. Cuvier 
extracts this constant from function, which remains the same across the diversity of instruments 
that make it operate: respiration, movement, sensation, digestion, circulation. Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire refuses it for the reasons I just explained; and he replaces it with the principle of position 
and transformation in space. 
We have two solutions: the functionalist solution and the topological solution for resolving 
the same problem born out of the same transformation: the eradication of visible criteria for the 
identification of biological segments. Two solutions that produced two different outcomes in the 
history of science. On the one hand, Cuvier, in looking to function for factors that would allow for 
the individualization of organs, made possible the doubling of anatomy by a physiology that be-
came increasingly independent. Through this operation, Cuvier in a way made it possible for 
physiology to emerge out of anatomy. On the other hand, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire introduced a 
certain analysis of interior space into the individual through his discovery of topological criteria. 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire therefore enriched anatomy while Cuvier liberated physiology. 
In this way the two solutions, applied to the same problem and emerging from the same 
transformation, find their place in the history of biology: one for the development of physiology, 
the other for the insertion of topology into anatomy. 
It is obvious that the freeing of physiology was more immediately fruitful: from Magendie 
to Claude Bernard, physiology at that time had achieved an epistemological level that made pos-
sible its direct use in biology. By contrast, by inserting a topological analysis into the anatomical 
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relation, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire took part in a more risky operation which, at the time, might have 
seemed fanciful. In fact, Cuvier did not understand this move by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. He saw 
in it the reappearance of the theme of naturalism [Naturphilosophie]. In reality, it was also some-
thing else. Topology as an applied science did not become useful until long after 1830. It made 
sense for Cuvier to be effective and productive at that very moment. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, by 
contrast, remaining in a sort of limbo in the history of science, was not able to effectively return to 
being productive until after the moment when normal anatomy, like teratology, was able to rec-
ognize the problem of topology. 
J. Piveteau: In tracing in our own research the outcome of the two great principles in Cuvier 
and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, the principle of correlations and the principle of connections, we have 
become increasingly aware that, for us, these principles are complementary principles. The prin-
ciple of correlations gives unity to the animal while the principle of connections gives unity to the 
animal series. We need both principles. The principle of correlation makes possible reconstruc-
tions with Cuvier. The principle of connections makes it possible to track all along the way a ge-
netic series of transformations. Right now we do not see the need to oppose them to each other. 
Following this research, we can think of each of these as two complementary principles that do 
not work on the same level. 
Y. Conry: 1. Is there not in Cuvier’s work a condition of impossibility for a thought of evo-
lution, specified as a Darwinian theory of evolution? This condition of impossibility could be ar-
ticulated thus: in Cuvier’s “discursive field,” isn’t the representation of the organism, within the 
modality of strict correlations, an obstacle, even the major obstacle, to a theory of evolution?—in 
other words, I refer here to the context of this morning’s lecture by M. Limoges. 
2. M. Foucault said that the transformations we find in Darwin came about through the 
texts of Cuvier. 
a. If we accept this assertion, I would like to know how it is that the foundation of Darwin-
ian thought is found elsewhere than in Cuvier’s discursive field. I’m alluding to the ecological and 
bio-geographical context that is the determining place for Darwin’s thought. It seems to me that if 
we accept that Darwin was formed elsewhere than in Cuvier’s field, then Cuvier cannot even be a 
relay in relation to a theory of subsequent evolution. 
b. How to explain the resistance to Darwinism in the name of the Cuvier school (for exam-
ple, in Flourens, one of Cuvier’s disciples)? 
c. M. Foucault’s proposal outlining the disappearance of thresholds ended up convincing 
me that Cuvier does in fact constitute a moment of rupture in relation to the 18th century. But 
doesn’t this pattern remain indifferent with regard to the problem of evolution? 
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B. Balan: 1. The first question concerns the nature of the internal link.12 You said in The Or-
der of Things (p. 263): “The internal link by which structures are dependent upon one another is no 
longer situated solely at the level of frequency; it becomes the very foundation of all correlation.” 
I’m convinced that the passage from the problems of the classifiers of the 18th century to 
the problem of species in Darwin involves a new conception of the internal link, an analysis of the 
internal structure of the organism. On this point, the principle of correlation in Cuvier plays a 
crucial role, and could have an importance that goes beyond Cuvier. But this leads me to ask 
about the nature of the internal link which, taking into account the development of the “Cuvier” 
paragraph in The Order of Things, leads to Cuvier’s adoption of a finalist, vitalist, and fixist view.  
From there the problem: does the idea of the internal link require a principle of correla-
tions in the way Cuvier proposed? I take up again the argumentation I developed with regard to 
the elaboration of chemical theory. In his letters to Pfaff,13 Cuvier early on made clear his interest 
in chemistry: the chemistry of Lavoisier. In these letters, he recommends reading Lavoisier and 
the Annals of Chemistry. I remember a letter where he discusses the first six volumes of the Annals 
of Chemistry, which he urges Pfaff to read; in the seventh volume, he recommends the analyses 
made by Lavoisier about problems of chemistry relating to Pfaff. Cuvier distances himself from 
Aristotle who, for good reason, had no knowledge of the laws of physics and chemistry. This 
gives me a sense of the great importance of the role played by chemistry in the Lessons of Compara-
tive Anatomy (the 1st lesson and the 24th, t. IV) and the letter to Lacépède. In Cuvier we find the 
                                                 
12 A mimeographed text distributed before the session articulated the question as the following: “Is it really Cu-
vier rather than Lavoisier who constitutes the moment of rupture between natural history and biology (if there 
was a rupture)? 
The Order of Things (p. 263): “The internal link by which structures are dependent upon one another is no longer 
situated solely at the level of frequency; it becomes the very foundation of all correlation.”  
This internal link seems to refer to the “calculation” [“calcul”] of the nature of beings. Cf. The History of the Pro-
gress of the Natural Sciences, 1826, t. I, p. 249. This calculation itself seems grounded in respiration. Cf. Lessons in 
Comparative Anatomy, 1805, t. IV, 24th lesson, p. 168: importance of circulation grounded in blood, vehicle of oxy-
gen. The perspective on oxygenation makes possible the introduction of a quantitative point of view. Cf. op. cit., p. 
172 and following. 
This problem seems homologous to the one in Fourcroy. Cf. System of Chemical Knowledges, Brumaire year IX, 
section VIII, order IV, art. 2, 7 (t. X, p. 373 sq.), art 11 and 12 (pp. 405-413). 
Finally, the theory of combustion is understood by Cuvier to be the most important in the revolutions approved 
by the natural sciences since the 18th century. Cf. The History of the Progress of the Natural Sciences, 1826, t. I, p. 62 
sq. 
Consequences: can these ruptures not be understood as the result of a series of displacements producing new 
articulations within a preliminary notional system? 
Does the existence of such a game of displacements not make the consideration of a domain or a plurality of 
domains impossible without taking into account, at the same time, the articulation of a chosen object or objects 
of study in relation to the general network of available scientific concepts at a given moment? 
13 Letter dated December 31, 1790. 
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possibility of interpreting physiology out of chemistry, the chemistry of Lavoisier. And that refers 
us back to the text by Fourcroy.14 
There are texts present in The History of the Progress of the Natural Sciences where we see that 
the principle of the correlation of forms was preceded by the problem of the correlation of func-
tions. This problem concerns the relation between circulation and respiration. Finally, respiration 
took the first step because of a theory of oxygenation that introduced a quantitative point of view; 
but this point of view was subsequently eliminated. As for modern scientific physiology, Cuvier 
was able to contribute to its founding because of the importance he attributed to chemistry in his 
system. But I had the impression that after having spoken about physiology in his work, he then 
dodged it. Starting from the moment when the correlation of functions is transformed into the 
correlation of forms, at that precise moment I think we can no longer say that Cuvier directly in-
troduces physiology. It seems that experimental physiology will move to the sidelines. With Cu-
vier, one can conceive, with much nuance—with Dareste and Milne-Edwards it will be differ-
ent— that there is a comparative physiology that is established. But that physiology tends to ori-
ent itself toward metaphorical pseudo-explanations that have little to do with experimentation in 
the status it achieved with Claude Bernard. But this is about a physiological experimentation 
whose principles go back much further. 
Even if one considers the principle of correlations as necessary for moving from a pre-
Cuvierian theory of species to a post-Cuvierian theory, one can ask oneself if the principle itself 
justifies finalism and fixism. In fact, I found a text of the reports by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and 
Latreille on the Mémoire of Laurencet and Meyran; in this report, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Latreil-
le take up again the principle of correlation against Cuvier himself (in Minutes of the Academy of 
Sciences, February 15, 1830, t. Ix, 1828-1831). The problem involves knowing if, with vertebrates 
and invertebrates, one is dealing with a totality that is differently interwoven or differently com-
bined. “In order to prove this proposition, we must find there the subject of a text that supports 
the most surprising of anomalies. There would be more to do there than to support the opposite 
thesis, because we would have to admit that these organs could only exist if they were generated 
by one another and, because of the reciprocal suitability of the circulatory actions of the nervous 
system, would give up the possibility of belonging to each other, to be together in agreement. But 
such a hypothesis is not admissible because as soon as there is no longer harmony among organs, 
life ceases. Thus, more animal, no more animal . . . But if, on the contrary, life persists, it is be-
cause all the organs remain in their habitual and inevitable relations, and play amongst them-
selves as they ordinarily would, from moment to moment; they are linked together by the same 
order of formation, subjected to the same rule and, like all animal compositions, will not be able 
to escape the effects of the universal law of Nature: the unity of composition.” 
Further, the unity of composition is a transformational model that makes it possible to in-
troduce the problem of specifically experimental teratology. Consequently, the correlation be-
                                                 
14 The System of Chemical Knowledges, year IX, t. X, p. 363 sq. 
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tween organs is functionally justified by the necessity of survival: it can also function inde-
pendently of fixist theories, within the context of rules of development. 
Is the problem of the correlation of functions necessary? Couldn’t the principle of connec-
tions we find in Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire fulfill the same function? 
I will justify this point of view, taking into account the students of Cuvier, Richard Owen, 
and Milne-Edwards. From the point of view of specialists in morphology, comparative anatomy, 
or embryology, it appears they were not able to preserve the principle of correlations as Cuvier 
had developed it, except in paleontology. I’m thinking specifically of Richard Owen. There we see 
the abandonment of the principle of functional correlations in favor of the systematic utilization 
of principles of connection considered as heuristic principles in comparative anatomy. This, in 
fact, is how I read Richard Owen’s Lessons in Comparative Anatomy, and his work on the archetype 
and homologies in the vertebrate skeleton. There is a transformation in the problems posed fol-
lowing taxonomy of the 18th century. What are the conditions of this transformation and what is 
the philosophy implied by these conditions? I think that the reworking of principles from the be-
ginning of the century made more things possible than a theory of life defined through interiority. 
Because we cannot speak of interiority when we read texts like those by Virchow or Haeckel and 
his school. 
2. The second question concerns the scale of beings.15 
I remain unconvinced concerning the problem of the scale of beings, for it is necessary to 
distinguish between what a certain number of authors affirm on a theoretical level, on the one 
hand, and on the other, the elements that they refuse to take into consideration, about which they 
refuse to speak, but which seem to play a deep role, and that force them to introduce gaps and 
complications into the pattern. These complications in the pattern could be considered, in some 
                                                 
15 A mimeographed text distributed before the session articulated the question as the following: “Is Cuvier’s 
fractioning of the scale of beings a major fact? The Order of Things, pp. 271-272. Cf. Mémoire Concerning the Hyale 
Animal, a New Genre of Mollusk but Intermediary between the Hyale and the Clio, and the Establishment of a New Order 
in the Class of Mollusks, 1817, where the idea that apparent voids are often there only because we do not know all 
beings. Cf. p. 10: the Pneumoderma: neither cephalopods nor gasteropods nor acephalous organisms: tendency 
of nature to utilize all possible combinations. Cf. Colman, G. Cuvier, Zoologist, pp. 172-173. 
There is a substitution of beam for scale in a context of plenitude. This plenitude appears as a constant in Cuvi-
er’s thought. Cf. Daudin, Zoological Classes and the Idea of Animal Series, 1926, t. II, p. 249 sq. 
Consequences: is the introduction of difference not in fact due to an antagonism between, on the one hand, the 
scale of beings and, on the other, the renewal of the living combination thanks to perspectives opened up by 
chemistry? 
Also, if difference introduced in this way constitutes a possibility for thinking life, does that new possibility not 
belong to a system that confronts it with the theme of the scale of beings and the conception of the plan that 
morphologists created starting with Goethe? 
In other words, do we have a founding space of new oppositions or a new opposition that appears inside a pre-
liminary system which, on the one hand, has become inadequate but which, on the other, always constitutes an 
efficient system of reference points? 
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way, as anticipatory elements of later breaks. In fact, I think that in the field of neurology, for ex-
ample, you’ve had a period characterized by the principle of localizations that developed in a 
completely coherent and systematic way. But it seems that the augmentation of the clinical mate-
rial led to complications in the theory, and it’s starting from the moment when theory became so 
complicated that in fact a break occurred and a certain number of authors agreed to figure out 
how to approach this problem in a completely different way. 
During the 18th century, various kinds of devices for observation had accumulated. These 
devices produced a point of rupture and Cuvier was the first beneficiary of this rupture. All the 
givens brought forward by specialists in zoology and paleontology made it no longer possible to 
think the living world within the frame of the scale of beings. It had to be reworked. We therefore 
have this question: what will this system of concepts be that will end with the most important and 
most effective reorganization on the epistemological level? There is a problem of the opening of a 
new epistemological field. There is the problem of how the opening of this epistemological field 
will happen. With Cuvier, there are ideological elements. What is the role of these elements? To 
what extent have these elements subtended scientific research? Have they served as obstacles to 
this scientific research? 
M. Foucault: It seemed to me that there are three technical questions that we could discuss. 
1. The first concerns the possibility or impossibility, beginning with Cuvier and his biolo-
gy, of thinking the history of living beings. 
2. The problem of the continuity of beings and the way in which Cuvier conceived, exor-
cized, banished, reutilized, fragmented, whatever you like, the scale of beings. 
3. The relation between Cuvier’s biology and certain closely related sciences and, in par-
ticular, chemistry. 
There are also two series of general questions, methodological questions. 
1. The problem of method concerning the very functioning of the history of science. And 
first the notion of obstacle. What do we mean when we say Cuvier was the obstacle to…. or that 
the chain of beings was an obstacle to….? 
2. The problem of the individual or individuality. We have spent our time saying: “Cuvi-
er,” “Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire,” or “That happens through Cuvier” or “We find that in Cuvier’s 
work.” What is this curious individualization? How do we manipulate the concepts of author, 
work, individual when we create the history of science? 
 
A. Let’s first look at the problem of chemistry. 
Cuvier says himself that Lavoisier was an important moment in the natural sciences. 
M. Balan, from there, presents the problems of calculation and quantification: he asks if 
there was not in Cuvier, at a given moment, the temptation, the open possibility of using chemis-
try inside biology, of introducing experimental methods and quantitative analyses. 
I will make a few remarks. In the text cited, Cuvier talks about Lavoisier and his im-
portance; he speaks of Lavoisier’s importance in the “natural sciences.” This is something com-
pletely different than “natural history.” The natural sciences constitute a higher category than 
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natural history, which includes physics, chemistry, geography. Lamarck himself makes this dis-
tinction. The natural sciences include everything that is not mathematics. Cuvier therefore thinks 
about Lavoisier and chemistry not in their relation to natural history, but in their relation to the 
experimental sciences. I’ll compare this text to another where Cuvier speaks about someone who 
was as important as Lavoisier in chemistry: Jussieu in natural history. In general, Cuvier situates 
Lavoisier and Jussieu in the pantheon of the natural sciences: Lavoisier for chemistry and Jussieu 
for natural history. But M. Balan’s analysis will not be more accepted when it concerns the calcu-
lation of quantification in Cuvier. 
There is, here, an important problem. In fact, the term calculation [calcul] is often used by 
Cuvier. But what does he mean by it? In the texts from the period 1789-1808, he says that taxono-
my calculates the nature of each species, according to the number of organs, their extension, their 
shape, their connections, their direction. Calculation in Cuvier is not the calculation of quantity, 
but in some way the logical calculation of variable structural elements. It is a structural calcula-
tion and not a quantitative one. Further, when Cuvier uses the vocabulary of quantity, he speaks 
about it in a different context than that of calculation. He speaks about it with regard to physio-
logical or chemical processes of respiration. But to say what? That the force of the movements of 
vertebrates depends on the quantity of their respiration; that the quantity of respiration depends 
on the quantity of blood reaching the organs; and that this quantity of blood reaching the organs 
depends on the disposition of respiratory organs and organs of circulation. These organs of circu-
lation can be double. The quantity of blood is therefore important. The organs can be simple, and 
the quantity of blood lesser. In this way quantity becomes purely a matter of interpretation. It is a 
matter of degree. There is more or less movement, more or less blood. Cuvier never utilized 
measurement to calculate quantity. Consequently, these three notions: calculation, quantity, 
measurement, all of which, for us, are associated with one another, for Cuvier are curiously dis-
tinct. We have: 
1. a calculation that is the structural calculation of organic variables; 
2. the consideration of quantity which in some way is an interpreted quantity; 
3. absence of measurement. 
It cannot be said without extreme confusion that Cuvier’s consideration of chemistry ever opened 
up for him the possibility of a certain quantitative and measurable biology. 
On this subject I would like to introduce a remark. In the history of science we must make 
a clear distinction between two different processes. 
We assert sometimes the actual introduction of an epistemological field constructed else-
where into another epistemological field. This happened, for example, when the relatively closed 
and autonomous epistemological field, about which I tried to define the principles of closure and 
autonomy and that one could call taxonomy, toward the end of the 18th century was traversed 
and penetrated by another epistemological field constituted elsewhere, that of anatomy. The in-
tertwining of these two different epistemological threads determines a new discourse that can be 
characterized as biology. I do not want to say that this is the only interference that was produced. 
That the physiological field, to the extent that it existed then, was introduced is another fact. From 
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there we must distinguish the possibility (given by the constitution, organization, and distribu-
tion of the epistemological field) of utilizing— either generally or regionally, either at the level of 
method or at the level of concepts—epistemological elements that function elsewhere. It seems to 
me, then, that Cuvier’s biology as it was constituted and to the extent that it introduced the prob-
lem of respiration, introduced a problem that, at a given moment, could not fail to call on chemi-
cal theory. And to that extent Cuvier’s biology made possible, in its time, the constitution of bio-
chemistry. But it did not carry it out. 
 
B. Let’s examine now the problem of the scale of beings. 
In certain theoretical texts, Cuvier says that the reign of the chain of beings is over. Do these re-
flexive propositions translate well into Cuvier’s actual practice? Are they not, in fact, a kind of 
ideal claim? Didn’t Cuvier’s scientific practice, in one way or another, continue to use the chain of 
beings as its guiding thread? 
Cuvier critiques the chain of beings, and not continuity. At any rate, no one ever accepted, 
even within the frame of classical taxonomy, an actual continuity of beings. In one way or anoth-
er, either by means of catastrophes, or by means of a blurring due to milieu, one always admitted 
to a kind of discontinuity. What Cuvier critiques is the affirmation that every being, whatever it 
might be—as long as it is not the first, or the simplest, or the most complex, or man— is a passage; 
the affirmation, in other words, that one can find for it in one way or another two adjacent areas 
at once immediate and symmetrical. Cuvier also refuses the idea of a progressive gradation—the 
idea that there is a constant difference between beings succeeding one another and that every de-
gree of the scale is occupied, has been occupied, or will be occupied. Finally, in the last place, Cu-
vier refuses the idea of a single series on which all beings, whatever the criteria of classification 
one uses, could be uniformly arranged. 
There is, then, in Cuvier, a critique of three themes: the theme of passage, the theme of 
gradation, and the theme of the unity of a series. 
However, the concept Cuvier constantly uses is that of hiatus. What does he mean by that? 
He does not mean (and he says so expressly) either the catastrophic disappearance of certain spe-
cies that would have assured the continuity of a unitary biological chain, or the “chance dissemi-
nation” of differences. By hiatus, Cuvier means: 
1. The first effect of the principle of correlations; if a certain organ is present (or absent), 
certain others should necessarily be present (or absent); this does not then give us a gradation of 
species presenting the entire table of all possible presences and absences, but indissociable “pack-
ets” of presences and absences. From there the hiatus of biological reality in relation to the abstract 
calculation of possibilities. 
2. The effect of the unity of the plan: each great category obeys a certain anatomical and 
functional plan. Another category will follow another plan. From one to the other, there is an en-
tire reorganization, an entire redistribution. These diverse plans do not constitute a linear series of 
isolated transformations. Cephalopods, Cuvier says, are not the passage from nothing to nothing. 
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One cannot say that they are more or less perfect than this or that. They do not result from the 
development of other animals and they will not develop into perfected animals. 
3. The effect of the principle of heterogeneous gradations: if it is true that a unique and 
global scale cannot be established, one can nevertheless establish diverse gradations: across the 
species one can follow, for example, an increase in circulation and the quantity of oxygen ab-
sorbed; or again, the growing complexity of the digestive system. One can thus arrive at several 
series, some of them parallel and others intersecting one another. In any case, it is not possible to 
place them all on a single line and from there to form an uninterrupted series. One cannot run 
through all of them without discontinuity. What we have is not a scale but a network. 
There would be no sense in saying: everything is continuous before Cuvier, everything is 
discontinuous after him. Classical taxonomy accepted certain forms of discontinuity; and Cuvier, 
certain forms of continuity. But what is important and should be determined is the very new and 
particular way in which Cuvier put into play the continuous with the discontinuous. 
Here is a precise example: the way in which Cuvier came to define two genera next to the 
genus Clio (Hyale and Pneumoderma). M. Balan sees in this discovery the application of the old 
principle of the “chain of beings.” The genus Clio being isolated and vaguely situated between 
cephalopods and gasteropods, Cuvier would have sought out indispensable intermediaries: he 
would have tried to reconstitute the degrees that would allow the lacuna to be filled. 
But this is to completely misrecognize Cuvier’s work. What did Cuvier actually do? 
First, a declaration of principle. “It seems that nature has been too fertile to not have creat-
ed any principle form without successively dressing it in all the accessory details to which it is 
predisposed.” This text, despite its appearance, does not refer to a continuous chain of beings. 
Cuvier does not affirm that there should necessarily be an intermediary between the gasteropod 
and the cephalopod. What he says is that there exists a form, that of the Clio, and that this form is 
single, isolated. Then, following the principle of the richness of nature, one can affirm that when 
nature has a form it takes advantage of it by varying it and giving it a certain number of sub-
models of this general model. This is not about the continuity of the chain, of a passage from one 
extremity to the other, of a bridge thrown from one shore of nature to the other. It is simply about 
a principle of nature filling in the form it has been given. It is the saturation of an order in genera. 
We find an animal like the Clio, whose genus is neither among the cephalopods nor the gastero-
pods. As a function of the principle that nature is miserly and generous (miserly in the number of 
forms, generous in the way it fills in each of these forms), there should well be other genera that 
must fill in this species with the form that we see appearing in the Clio. This is Cuvier’s heuristic 
principle. He will not seek out other genera next to the Clio in order to fill in this family that is 
still empty, or occupied by a genus. He looks for the Clio’s own character and, doing this, he finds 
two other animals, the Hyale and the Pneumoderma, who obey the same form. They can consti-
tute a family characterized in this way: free swimming body; distinct head with no other limbs 
but fins. Thus the progress of research toward constituting the new family was not meant to fill in 
a lacuna on the scale of beings; it was intended to show how nature fills in form from the moment 
form is given to it. There cannot be a unique genus in an order; this is the postulation and not: 
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there should be an intermediary between two different genera. One must saturate the order, final-
ly constituting a multiplicity of genera that in fact say what the full reality of the order consists of. 
G. Canguilhem: I would like to add a word about the scale of beings by recalling the exist-
ence of the article, “Nature,” in the Dictionary of the Natural Sciences,16 where Cuvier uses the three 
scholastic concepts of leap, hiatus, and void; that is, these three concepts that appear in the axi-
oms that Kant comments on in the Transcendental Methodology. It is there that he says: there is not 
a leap, there are hiatuses—despite those who say, referring to the scale of beings, that when they 
discover a gap an intermediary should be found. However, in multiplying by a hundred the 
number of known species, these voids remain. And this is what is strange, that one could have 
reproached Cuvier, in his supposed Aristotelianism, for thinking scholastically, when in fact his 
refutation and his critiques apply to the three fundamental concepts that scholastic philosophy 
used when it came to demonstrating the continuity of forms. 
J. Piveteau: I thank M. Foucault and all who took part in these debates. 
G. Canguilhem: We thank M. Piveteau, in the name of this institute’s teachers and research-
ers, for accepting to preside over these debates. 
S. Delorme: I would like to ask Mlle Conry to present her objections. 
Y. Conry: 1. To say that the critique of Darwinism could only have happened through Cu-
vier’s texts, that Darwinism’s conditions of possibility were Cuvier’s discourse, leaves two facts 
unexplained, even unintelligible: 
a. the fact that Darwin’s discursive field was foreign to that of Cuvier, that is, it was insti-
gated and developed starting from an ecological and bio-geographical problem; 
b. the fact that a part of the resistance to Darwinism was developed within the context of 
the Cuvier school itself, however broadly one understands this school. 
2. Isn’t the pattern of the disarticulation of epistemological and ontological thresholds, if it 
is really a moment and place of rupture in classical though, indifferent to a theory of evolution? In 
other words, does the study of epistemological transformations authorize us to think of Cuvier as 
Darwin’s relay? 
M. Foucault: Your second question: “How to explain the resistance to Darwinism, by Cuvi-
er’s disciples, like Flourens, for example, if it is true that Cuvier was Darwinism’s condition of 
possibility?” touches on the problem of method. I do not think that, in the historical field, we can 
give the same status or function to resistance on the conceptual level and “archeological” re-
sistance situated at the level of discursive formations. 
1. A concept like that of the fixity of species is opposed, term for term, to that of the evolu-
tion of species and, as a consequence, can create an obstacle to it. 
2. A theory like that of a nature in historical evolution is opposed to that of a nature creat-
ed once and for all by an all-powerful hand and, from this fact, they resist one another. Already, 
these two orders of resistance are not the same and do not function in the same way. At a third 
                                                 
16 T. XXXIV, 1825, p. 261. 
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level, that of discursive formations, we can also speak about phenomena of resistance. But they 
are of a completely different order; they unfold according to very different processes (thus the 
resistance of a natural history, based in the analysis of characters, to a biology based in the analy-
sis of physiological functions and anatomical structures). On the one hand, this last form of re-
sistance may well be more important and more massive, but it does not necessarily bring with it 
the longest and noisiest polemics; and, on the other hand, the first two forms of resistance can 
easily be produced inside the same single discursive formation. I tried to show with regard to 
Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire how their opposition regarding the criteria for identifying or-
ganic segments had the same condition of possibility in the biology they cofounded. 
We can now look at the Darwin-Cuvier opposition and the function of relay found in the 
constitution of Darwinism through Cuvier’s biology. 
The concept of condition of existence is, without a doubt, one of the fundamental concepts 
of biology starting at the beginning of the 19th century. It does not seem to me to be either super-
imposable or isomorphic with the concepts of influence or milieu as we find them in the natural 
history of the 18th century. Those notions, in fact, were meant to account for an excess of variety; 
they were concerned with factors of additional diversification; they served to account for the fact 
that a type could become another. By contrast, the notion of condition of existence is concerned 
with the eventual impossibility of an organism continuing to live if it were not as it is and exactly 
where it is: it refers to that which constitutes the limit between life and death. In a general way, 
the object of natural history in the classical age is an ensemble of differences to be observed; in the 
19th century, the object of biology is that which is capable of living and subject to dying. This idea 
that the living is linked to the possibility of dying refers to two possible systems of conditions of 
existence: 
--conditions of existence understood as an internal system, that is, correlations. If you take 
away its claws, or if you don’t give it teeth that crush, it will die. This is the internal condition of 
existence, and that implies a biology that articulates itself directly onto anatomo-physiology; 
--conditions of existence understood as a threat coming from the milieu or a threat to the 
individual—of no longer being able to live—if the milieu changes. Biology is articulated through 
the analysis of the relations between the milieu and the living, that is, through ecology. 
The double articulation of biology through physiology, on the one hand, and through 
ecology, on the other, is contained in the conditions of possibility from the moment one defines 
the living through its conditions of existence and its possibilities of death. 
From then on we see that ecology, as a science integrable with biology, has the same condi-
tions of possibility as physiology as a science integrable with taxonomy. The integration of 
anatomo-physiology into taxonomy was achieved by Cuvier. The integration of ecology into biol-
ogy was achieved by Darwin. All this starting from the same epistemological conditions. 
C. Limoges: There is nothing that contradicts what Mlle Conry and I think. I’m very satis-
fied with this second response. 
S. Delorme: The second question, posed by M. Saint-Sernin, involves the difference empha-
sized by M. Foucault between grounded [fondé], natural, and real. 
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M. Foucault: From the moment one accepts a continuum of variations from one individual 
to another, genera cannot be settled, nor can they exist with perfectly designated thresholds. Na-
ture does not isolate genera; in establishing regions of resemblance, it simply allows for the 
reestablishment of genera that will be well grounded [bien fondés] provided they follow the layer 
of resemblances among individuals with different morphologies. When Linnaeus takes a simple, 
constant criterion for all plants, he categorizes all plants within his own system. But, to the extent 
that he took as a variable only a small sector of vegetal being, because they have similar sexual 
organs, he categorizes into the same category living beings that have very different general ap-
pearances. As a consequence, he will have chosen a localized criterion of resemblance without 
taking into consideration the natural series of global resemblances. In this sense the Linnaean cat-
egories are arbitrary and abstract. The problem for those who succeeded Linnaeus—the method-
ists and Jussieu, for example—was to come up with classifications such as those found in the 
same genus, in the same class as plants that actually resemble each other in every aspect. This is 
the grounded genus [genre fondé] as opposed to the abstract genus of Linnaeus. 
B. Saint-Sernin: I thought I understood “grounded” [“fondé”] to mean that which allowed a 
suitable, natural distribution to take place, a distribution that would align with observation and 
experience. 
M. Foucault: … with the total observation of the species. The real as given to intuition can 
be tracked as such by a certain number of procedures that can be either methodological or sys-
tematic. 
M.-D. Grmek: The pattern proposed by M. Foucault, and his demarcation of the two major 
thresholds, is a logical construction. This begs the question: what is its historical content? And, in 
the context of this debate, does Cuvier’s work really represent a fundamental break in the process 
of the historical explanation of this pattern? 
 It is certain that the two proposed thresholds—the passage from species to genus and from 
individual to species—have a historical reality: for a long time they have posed a problem to be 
resolved. Parenthetically, I’m surprised that you called the first threshold “ontological” and the 
second “epistemological;” I would have expected the inverse, because the first threshold intro-
duces the problem of classification and the second that of existence, of being. In order to surpass 
these two thresholds, a series of solutions was proposed in the history of biology. Early on, all the 
logical possibilities were imagined and I do not see, from an epistemological perspective, how 
Cuvier’s work really brings anything new. 
To be sure, it brings something new from the point of view of concrete classification or 
taxonomic details, but the thresholds you spoke about are not actually surpassed. For contempo-
rary science, the two thresholds are crossed: for the first threshold, the solution is in phylogenetic 
affiliations, that is, in the theory of evolution and, for the second, in modern genetics. In order to 
find the historical break, we would have to look for the origin of these two solutions and, with the 
problem before us here, see if Cuvier’s work is part of this process of radical change. 
M. Foucault: In the history of science I do not think we can speak of change in absolute 
terms. How we classify discourses, the level at which we approach them, or the analytic grid we 
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impose on them, will determine what appears to us: continuities, discontinuities, constancies, or 
modifications. If you follow the history of the concept of species, or that of the theory of evolu-
tion, obviously Cuvier does not constitute a change. But the level on which I situate myself is not 
that of conceptions or theories: rather, I engage the operations within a scientific discourse that 
allow objects to appear, concepts to be put to work, and theories to be constructed. At this level, 
one can identify cuts: but, on the one hand, they do not necessarily coincide with those that can be 
identified elsewhere (for example at the level of the concepts themselves or at the level of theory); 
and, on the other hand, they do not offer themselves in a visible way on the surface of discourse. 
They have to be detected, starting with a certain number of signs. 
We can find the first indication of a cut in a sudden change affecting all the objects, con-
cepts, and theories that appear at a given moment (thus, we can say generally that medical ob-
jects, concepts, and theories from Hippocrates to the end of the 18th century show relatively weak 
indications of modification. By contrast, if you take Boissier de Sauvages and Bichat, you see that 
in forty years, in twenty-five years, everything changed, and much more than over the course of 
the preceding several centuries). We can find another indication of a cut in the exact inverse phe-
nomenon: return and repetition; suddenly, a state of knowledge [savoir] mimes in a certain way a 
prior state. All these signs indicating cuts can function as initial identifiers. But for me, the final 
goal of the analysis is not to say that there is a cut; rather, starting with these strange phenome-
na—sudden changes, overlaps— it is to ask at what level the transformations that made the cuts 
possible are situated. In the end, an analysis should not indicate a cut and then respect it indefi-
nitely; it should describe a transformation. 
It seems to me there exists a Cuvier transformation, and that this transformation was nec-
essary in order to go from the state of knowledge characteristic of the classical period (I have tried 
to define this abstractly through the pattern of thresholds) to this other state of knowledge that 
we find in Darwin. Indeed, this passage implies a homogenization of all the supra-individual cat-
egories, from variety to order, class, and family (we find this homogenization actualized in Cuvi-
er with the exception of variety); this passage also implied that the individual contains, at the lev-
el of its anatomo-physiological structures and its internal conditions of existence, that which 
makes it belong to the ensemble of its species, its genus, and its family (this is in fact how Cuvier 
conceived species, genus). In order to move from the state of Linnaeus to the state of Darwin in 
biological knowledge, the Cuvier transformation was necessary.  
M.-D. Grmek: Those who create a “historiographic” history of science need to bring it clos-
er to “epistemological” history. A link should exist between these two modes of historical presen-
tation. You have left aside the question that most affects the historiographer: if a change in the 
solution to a problem comes about, we need to specify what this change is, when and by whom it 
is produced. In the case we’re analyzing here, is Cuvier the point of departure for this change? 
For me he is not. 
M. Foucault: The pattern I’ve proposed is not meant to lock up all the concepts or theories 
that could be formed in a given period within an internal and impassable condition of existence; 
for example, between Linnaeus and Jussieu there is a difference of method, concepts, and perhaps 
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theories at least as great as the difference between Jussieu and Cuvier. Further, Cuvier said re-
peatedly that Jussieu was the one who discovered everything. At the level of conceptual or theo-
retical distance, Jussieu is closer to Cuvier than Linnaeus. The history of theories or concepts 
could establish links and distances and show that Jussieu is close to Cuvier. 
But that is not what concerns me. My problem is to see how they were formed, starting 
with what and according to which rules of constitution. Here we are confronted with paradoxical 
things: we can have analogous concepts and isomorphic theories that nonetheless obey different 
systems and rules of formation. It seems to me that Jussieu’s taxonomy is formed according to the 
same pattern as that of Linnaeus, even though he tries to surpass him. By contrast, Cuvier’s biol-
ogy seems to me to obey different rules of formation. A conceptual continuity or a theoretical 
isomorphism can perfectly well overlap with an archeological cut at the level of the rules of for-
mation for objects, concepts, and theories. 
M.-D. Grmek: In the history of biology, Cuvier thus represents a transformation, not a revo-
lution. 
M. Foucault: With this topic I’ve always avoided the word revolution. I’ve preferred the 
word transformation. 
Further, we encounter here an important methodological question: the problem of attribu-
tion. 
This problem does not arise in the same way at every level. Suppose we call the study of 
opinions of one or many individuals doxology: the individual is then taken as an invariant; the 
question becomes determining if we can legitimately attribute to him this thought, this formation, 
this text. A problem of authenticity. The major mistake is therefore to attribute to him what 
doesn’t belong to him, or on the contrary to leave in shadow a part of what he said, believed, or 
affirmed. We do not (at least in the first instance) ask questions about what an individual is, but 
rather about what can be attributed to him. 
 If we make an epistemological analysis of a concept or a theory, there is a good chance we 
are dealing with a meta-individual phenomenon; at the same time, it’s a phenomenon that 
traverses and demarcates the domain we can attribute to an individual. In the work of an author 
we are led to leave aside texts that are not relevant (juvenilia, personal writings, opinions put 
forth for an instant and then quickly abandoned). From then on, what does author mean? What 
use do we make, exactly, of the proper name? What do we designate when, under these condi-
tions, we say Darwin or Cuvier? 
 When it comes to studying discursive layers, or epistemological fields that include a plu-
rality of concepts and theories (simultaneous or successive plurality), it is obvious that individual 
attribution becomes almost impossible. Similarly, only with difficulty can the analysis of these 
transformations be referred to a precise individual. Transformation in general happens across the 
works of different individuals; it is not something like a discovery, a proposition, or a clearly 
formulated thought explicitly given within a work. Rather, the one who is looking for it notices 
transformation as something at work across different texts. The description I’m offering should be 
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able to dispense with any reference to individuality; or rather, it should take up again, from top to 
bottom, the problem of the author. 
 I must admit that I was uneasy (and with an unease I’ve had a hard time overcoming) 
when I emphasized names in The Order of Things. I said “Cuvier,” “Bopp,” “Ricardo;” in fact, in 
doing this I tried to use the name not to designate the totality of a work [oeuvre] that would re-
spond to a certain delimitation, but to designate a certain transformation that takes place in a giv-
en period and that we can see at work at a certain moment and, in particular, in the texts in ques-
tion. The use I made of the proper name in The Order of Things should be invalidated, and Ricardo 
or Bopp should be understood not as names that allow us to classify a certain number of works or 
a certain set of opinions, but as the acronyms of a transformation. We should say “Ricardo trans-
formation” the way we say “Ramsay effect.” This “Ricardo transformation” you find in Ricardo—
even though you find it elsewhere, before or after—is not important. My concern is to track trans-
formation. In other words, the author does not exist. 
 J.-F. Leroy: From a historical point of view, names are somewhat annoying. 
 M. Foucault: I readily agree. And I think that just as logicians and linguists confront the 
problem of the proper name, so too with the history of science and epistemology we should try to 
reflect on the usage of proper names. What do we mean to say when we say Cuvier or Newton? 
In fact it’s not clear. Even in literary history, we need a theory of the proper name. 
 F. Dagognet: The term “conditions of possibility” to which you refer has a “theoretical” 
meaning. But couldn’t it take on a more material meaning or content? 
 Why did we suddenly begin to list or classify animals? It certainly wasn’t so we could 
comprehend them in their diversity or better depict them. It was not for the purpose of order or 
amusement or theorization. 
 Hidden politico-economic pressures impose themselves. Every workshop in the 18th centu-
ry and, through them, the life of the nation, depends on plants and animals. There is an attempt to 
escape certain subjections. It quickly becomes possible to replace “fellow creatures” with others, 
those who eventually will be close to us and subject to the same “jobs” or customs. An attractive 
replacement. This replacement fills people with enthusiasm for further examination of similarities 
and the creation of families. Indeed, a promising axiom was discovered according to which, in the 
words of Linnaeus or Jussieu, an “individual” cannot enter a category (for which he possessed, 
moreover, the characteristic sign that would authorize immediate identification) without pos-
sessing all the fundamental qualities of that category. And if one does not discover those quali-
ties, it is because one did not look for them hard enough or one did not know how to express 
them. Time to search again. 
 Thus, such and such a plant is a legume: in these conditions, one should learn how to use 
it. It should, in one way or another, provide nourishment. One should therefore stimulate its pro-
duction. 
 From then on, one will know how to avoid extravagant imports and costly modes of influ-
ence. In short, the conditions of possibility, the agents of transformation refer back to national and 
industrial exigencies, actual situations rather than theoretical concerns or documentary or scrip-
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tural examinations. Modifications in writing or rankings [rangement] respond to necessities that 
are often technological or agronomical: to the contingency and the necessity of things. 
 M. Foucault: If you are speaking about material, social, and economic conditions, or tech-
niques of possibility, then I don’t think I’ve ignored them. In two instances—with regard to psy-
chiatry and clinical medicine—I sought the conditions of constitution and transformation of these 
orders of knowledge. It is careless to say that I busied myself with words at the expense of things.  
 C. Salomon: With regard to Cuvier, is it legitimate to use the term biology, to the extent that 
biology is interested in something that a cork plant, an elephant, and a man have in common? 
 M. Foucault: The formulation is pleasing. Overcome, perhaps, by my pleasure in hearing it, 
I’m having trouble understanding the point of the question. 
 C. Salomon: … You speak of Cuvier’s “biology.” Whoever says “biology” assumes the 
completion of the passage, or break, between a classical taxonomy (the classification of the living) 
and a physiology that concerns itself with life, an element that a cork plant, an elephant, and a 
man have in common, the object of a cellular physiology or a microbiology. 
 For Cuvier it is a matter of similarities of relations, not of common objects. Correlations are 
the object of taxonomy, not a vital unity. This means there are only living beings [des vivants] in 
Cuvier: there is not yet life [la vie] and therefore, strictly speaking, there is no “Cuvierian biolo-
gy.” 
 M. Foucault: That brings us to conditions of existence. 
 B. Balan: The philosophical implications of the principle of correlations. Isn’t this principle, 
implying finality, one from which the concept of finality will break away? 
 M. Foucault: Of course. The decisions, the links I try to establish between theories, con-
cepts, etc. and their systems of formation do not exclude the opposite possibility that a concept or 
a theory can break away from such a system. Take the concept of organization that was formed 
within classical taxonomy. Because it was essentially developed around Daubenton and Jussieu, it 
was reutilized by biology. 
 It seems to me that, after all the analyses and research projects that have a bearing on clas-
ses, kinship, and resemblances among living beings, in the end it is growth that characterizes the 
living [le vivant]. That which lives is that which grows and can grow in different ways. 
 1. To grow in size. The living is that which is subject to increase in size. This theme was 
important enough in natural history that, for a long time, it was thought that minerals grew and 
were therefore living. 
 2. To grow according to the variable of number. This growth through the variable of num-
ber is reproduction. It is interesting to note that for a long time it was believed that reproduction, 
through cuttings or sexuality, was a phenomenon of growth. Sexuality was not granted real inde-
pendence in its physiological functioning. To reproduce was to grow larger, but no longer within 
the individual context and through simple growth in size. To reproduce was to grow larger be-
yond one’s own size, through the procreation of new individuals. “Grow and multiply.” 
Foucault Studies, No. 22, pp. 208-237 
 235 
 3. Growth in the order of the living being can be identified in a third dimension which is 
neither that of the individual nor that of generation, but that of all species. Growth occurred 
through growth in complexity. Growth in form became more and more complex. 
 In other words, the living is what grows according to the variables of size or number and 
the variability of form: these three variables serve to classify individuals, characterize species, and 
identify genera. 
 We can even recognize among naturalists of the classical age a fourth variable of growth: 
position in space. To the extent that individuals multiply and revolutions of the globe occur, the 
interweaving of species increases; individuals previously separated and belonging to very differ-
ent groups mix together, and we see the development of those hybridizations that Linnaeus 
found so important at the end of his life; in this way, types are born which, in turn, respond to 
each other, etc. 
 So we can see that these four variables through which individuals and species grow ac-
cording to natural history are also the four variables through which individuals and species can 
be characterized and classified. All this makes natural history into a solid and coherent edifice. 
This means: 
 a. life is not defined through its relation to death, but through its possibility of extension. 
Life is that which continues and continues itself; 
 b. this continuity is not simply spatial but temporal; 
 c. sexuality is not recognized in its specificity but as a phenomenon of growth; 
 d. natural history encounters, as a major epistemological problem, the problem of conti-
nuity-increase, also one of the problems of physics and mechanics. 
 
Starting in the 19th century, biology is characterized by a certain number of essential modifica-
tions. 
 1. The individual is no longer defined so much through a possibility of growth inside a 
given form, but as a form that can only manifest itself under rigorous conditions and whose eras-
ure is not only disappearance but death (according to a process that is itself biological). 
 2. Sexuality appears as an autonomous biological function. Until then, sexuality was con-
sidered to be a kind of supplementary apparatus through which, having reached a certain stage, 
an individual shifted toward another mode of growth: no longer increase in size, but multiplica-
tion. Sexuality was a kind of growth alternator. Starting in the 19th century, one begins to look for 
what is specific about the relation between sexuality and growth. This research leads, on the one 
hand, to the discovery of the fusion of gametes and chromosomal reduction (in a sense, the oppo-
site of growth), and, on the other hand, to the idea—developed by Nussbaum and Weissmann—
that the individual is itself no more than an excrescence on the continuity of the germinal strain. 
Sexuality, instead of appearing at the point of the individual as the moment when growth be-
comes proliferation, becomes an underlying function in relation to this episode which is the indi-
vidual. 
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 3. Also appearing is the theme of a history no longer tied to continuity: starting from the 
moment, in time, of the confrontation between a life that does not want to die and a death that 
threatens life, there will be discontinuity. Discontinuity occurs in the conditions of this struggle 
and in its outcomes and phases. This is the principle of anatomico-physiological conditions: the 
theme of transformations and mutations. 
 The fact that, in 19th century thought, the themes of death, sexuality, and history appear 
seems to me to be the philosophical sanction of the transformation that happened in the field of 
life sciences. These three notions—Death, Sexuality, and History—which were weak, derived, 
secondary notions in the 17th and 18th centuries, suddenly erupt into the field of thought in the 19th 
century as major and autonomous notions, and provoke in the domain of philosophy a certain 
number of “reactions” in the strong sense of the term, that is, in its Nietzschean sense. And the 
problem for an entire philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries was to catch hold of these notions 
that had just appeared. Against the emergence of the notion of death, philosophy responded with 
the idea that it is normal, after all, for death and life to confront one another: because death is the 
fulfillment of life; because, in death, life finds its meaning; because death transforms life into fate. 
Against the theme of sexuality as an autonomous function with regard to the individual or indi-
vidual growth, philosophy responded with the idea that sexuality is not in reality independent of 
the individual since, through sexuality, the individual can in some sense develop itself, overflow 
itself, and enter into communication with others through love, within time, and through lineage. 
As for history and the discontinuity to which it is linked, it is useless to say how the use of a cer-
tain form of dialectic responded there to give it the unity of a meaning and the fundamental unity 
of a free consciousness with its project. 
 I call every philosophy that claims death as the last and ultimate meaning of life humanist 
philosophy. 
 Humanist philosophy: every philosophy that thinks sexuality is for loving and proliferating. 
 Humanist philosophy: every philosophy that believes history is tied to the continuity of con-
sciousness.  
 M.-D. Grmek: I admire the philosophico-historical tableau of the great theme of life you 
have just painted, but I’m troubled by the fact that, from Aristotle to the 19th century, the defini-
tions of life, formulated by the most influential scholars, take into account neither growth nor 
sexuality, but call on other characteristics considered to be the quid proprium of the vital phenom-
enon.  
 M. Foucault: I do not place myself on the level of theories and concepts, but on the level of 
how scientific discourse is practiced. See in fact how the living is distinguished from that which is 
not living. See what is analyzed in the living, what is deduced from the living in order to make it 
into a problem of natural history: it is still a matter of growth. 
 J.F. Leroy: During the 17th and 18th centuries, it is growth that is fundamental and that 
makes possible the advent of this notion of biology: growth as increase in size, multiplication, and 
differentiation. 
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 This will last for a long time, for it appears again in Darwin’s pangenesis theory. We al-
ready find it in Buffon and, over the course of the entire 18th century, one tries to explain evolu-
tion through diet and growth in size. One compares the evolution of species to the evolution of 
individuals. There is no doubt that this is what I call the historical point of view on biology before 
the 18th century.  
 M. Foucault’s presentation was illuminating. Before, I did not understand why he ap-
proached biology beginning with Cuvier. Now I understand that he gives a certain meaning to 
the term biology that we biologists expand. For us, biology is something broader. This first part of 
biology where we find this shift is also part of biology. This is how, in a sense, biology defines 
itself in the 18th century and, in botany for example, it is starting at the end of the 17th century that 
the question of sexuality becomes essential. 
 S. Delorme: I thank the Institute for the History of Science for allowing us to meet in order 
to better understand Cuvier’s philosophy… but also, and especially, the philosophy of M. Fou-
cault. 
 G. Canguilhem: The researchers and teachers at the Institute for the History of Science 
thank all the members of the audience, the natives, and the illustrious visitors who responded to 
our invitation with, for our part, the regret that we missed other illustrious visitors such as MM. 
Jacob and Vuillemin of the Collège de France, whom we had hoped to see here, and who sent 
their apologies. I want to thank the speakers. And so that my thanks will not seem like the speech 
for an award ceremony, I will thank them in the order of the increasing distances they had to 
travel in order to join us: M. Michel Foucault, from Vincennes; M. François Dagognet, from Ly-
ons; M. Francis Courtès, from Montpellier; M. Camille Limoges, from Montreal. 
 Finally, allow me a final thought for the one in whose name we have gathered together to 
listen to MM. Foucault, Dagognet, Courtès, Limoges: the man who, on August 23, 1769, received 
forever as “sign” the name of his father, Cuvier. 
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